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Abstract. Network signaling and control mechanisms are critical to coordinate such diverse
defense capabilities as honeypots and honeynets, host-based defenses, and online patching
systems, any one of which might issue an actionable alert and provide security-critical data.
Despite considerable work in exploring the trust requirements of such defenses and in ad-
dressing the distribution speed of alerts, little work has gone into identifying how the under-
lying transport systems behave under adversarial scenarios.
In this paper, we evaluate the reliability and performance trade-offs for a variety of con-
trol channel mechanisms that are suitable for coordinating large-scale collaborative defenses
when under attack. Our results show that the performance and reliability characteristics
change drastically when one evaluates the systems under attack by a sophisticated and tar-
geted adversary. Based on our evaluation, we explore available design choices to reinforce
the reliability of the control channel mechanisms. To that end, we propose ways to construct
a control scheme to improve network coverage without imposing additional overhead.
1 Introduction
The prevalence and effectiveness of large-scale malware phenomena (worms, botnets,
web-based malware) has led to the development of several automated defenses that detect
new threats and generate various kinds of fixes such as patches, filters. The security lit-
erature is rife with distributed security systems [7,5] which assume that reliable, scalable
and robust Content Distribution Network (CDN) functionality is universally available.
To date, the primary metrics of effectiveness have been propagation time (latency and
throughput) and node coverage in the presence of “natural” phenomena such as churn.
However, the conspicuous absence of an adversarial analysis, both in terms of perfor-
mance impact and security guarantees (e.g., susceptibility to man-in-the-middle attacks),
is of particular concern as the control channel for security data is a very attractive target
for adversaries. This is especially true for systems that make design decisions that favor
performance over robustness (e.g., using a centralized tracker in BitTorrent).
We argue that such a narrow view of system performance is inadequate and even
dangerous in the presence of malicious adversaries. In other areas of security (spam, hon-
eypots and honeynets, anti-virus), we have seen active targeting of protection mechanisms
and, occasionally, their hijacking and use for malicious purposes. Instead, we need to con-
sider system behavior in the presence of intelligent, targeted interference by botnets and
other malware. At a minimum, these systems must be able to withstand attacks that seek
to disrupt their primary function: the timely and reliable delivery of security-critical data
to all benign participating nodes and users.
To this end, we conduct an evaluation of control channel mechanisms that have been
proposed for use in distributing security-critical data at massive scale. Specifically, we
evaluate different approaches of centralized, distributed, and hybrid designs in presence
of global adversary. We recognize that this is only part of the security-oriented evaluation
criteria that such systems should be subjected to; however, we strive for an in-depth anal-
ysis of a particular aspect of system behavior rather than a shallower examination of more
features. A key contribution of our work is a detailed analysis of existing control chan-
nel mechanisms in a number of realistic adversarial scenarios. Rather than limiting our
measurements to simple latency and throughput characterizations, metrics of coverage,
latency, and control efficiency are considered. We use these to investigate the trade-offs
between system performance and resilience to certain type of attacks. Thus, our work ex-
plores the spectrum of possible design choices when creating and deploying a distribution
mechanism for security-critical data.
As a result of evaluation, we find that centralized designs introduce fragile failure
points, centralized entities, or hierarchical indirection, that can cripple performance and
reliability when attacked. Distributed mechanisms also cease to function upon failure of
nodes more than a certain threshold. Furthermore, the attacker can escalate his impact
on distributed mechanisms by taking advantage of heterogeneity of network knowledge
among participants. Extending reliability to some extent, the hybrid mechanism still in-
herits the shortcomings of both centralized and distributed systems. To maximize the re-
liability benefit of the hybrid mechanism, we explore the design choices available on
integrating two contrasting schemes without sacrificing control efficiency.
The road-map of the paper is as follows. After discussing background work (Sec-
tion 2), the adversarial scenarios are provided in Section 3. In Section 4, we show how
we implemented control mechanisms for evaluation. Section 5 delivers evaluation results.
Our analysis on these results are presented in Section 6 and the paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Control and Signaling Approaches
In contrast to the data transfer channel, the control channel performs its task by signal-
ing small sized management packets to the participating peers. The signaling channel is
responsible for: i) peer join and leave, ii) locating objects iii) resource scheduling and
allocation vi) authentication, integrity, and authenticity and v) application specific tasks –
for instance, a system for alert distribution raises an alarm of urgent security events using
this channel. Traditionally, there were two fundamental but contrasting schools of thought
regarding the design and implementation of the signaling mechanisms – centralized and
distributed. Recently, there are attempts to leverage the strengths of both distributed and
centralized schemes while avoiding some of their weaknesses by using a hybrid approach.
Centralized schemes These simple and efficient mechanisms require one or a small set of
centralized entities to coordinate the operations of the entire system. However, the scala-
bility of the system is limited by the network and processing capacity of the control nodes.
As a workaround, a hierarchical control network [27] consisting of super-nodes (SNs) was
proposed. The control plane is implemented by adding layer of super-nodes which act as
the leaders and are in charge of their own sub-networks. Unfortunately, selecting the right
super nodes and the size of the clustering for each sub-network is still an open problem.
This is further exacerbated in dynamic environments with many joins and leaves. More-
over, akin to the pure centralized solution, each super-node is single point of failure to its
own sub-network.
Distributed schemes This class of mechanisms is designed to mitigate the scalability
problems of the centralized design. Their design can be accomplished using either struc-
tured or unstructured overlay networks. Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) [25,13,22] is a
structured overlay solution that are leveraging the power of consistent hashing [9]. On
the other hand, the gossip-based information sharing protocols [18], also known as epi-
demic or flooding protocols, process requests from clients in unstructured way. The core
implementation relies in flooding search requests to peering neighbors. Nevertheless, de-
spite their numerous benefits, distributed solutions also come with their own limitations.
DHT-based approaches do not work well in practice [20] as their performance is severely
influenced by even a small fraction of slow performing nodes. Moreover, the gossip pro-
tocol becomes very costly as the size of network grows and has difficulty in locating
information with low availability. In following evaluations, we use DHTs to implement
distributed control channel.
Hybrid schemes These signaling mechanisms attempt to combine the advantages of the
centralized and the distributed (DHTs) design principles. During normal operations, a
hybrid system uses a fast and efficient centralized channel. It can, however, switch to a
slower but also more robust distributed channel to resolve capacity overload or even node
failures. There is a wealth of recent research on hybrid designs [29,8,10] all of which share
the same basic design principles with minor modifications. Moreover, there are systems
that attempt to combine two distributed mechanisms of structured (DHTs) and unstruc-
tured (gossip protocol) to achieve better search efficiency [12,28].
2.2 Reliability Analysis of Signaling Channels
There exist some previous works that focus on analyzing the reliability of network sys-
tems and the security protection of control channels. For reliability of centralized systems,
there is work relate to the stability of super-node networks. Yang et al. [27] suggest gen-
eral guidelines in designing super-node networks and about principles for reliable design.
Mitra et al. [15] propose an analytic framework that correlates super-nodes’ fraction and
their network connectivity with reliability. This work also considers a global adversary of
different knowledge and power. It does not, however, address hybrid schemes or provide
any comparison between systems. Distributed control systems are designed to be more
reliable but they introduce new threats and vulnerabilities which exploit the specifics of
each architecture. To counter the shortcomings, researchers proposed a number of im-
plementations [21] and theoretical studies [11,2] with the aim to improve the reliability
of distributed systems. Specific example of control channel which supervises the entire
system’s operation and becomes a viable target to the adversary is the BitTorrent tracker
network. Although originally designed as a centralized control, extensions have been pro-
posed to enhance the reliability of the tracker by having distributed tracker or multiple
trackers. Unlike previous studies on BitTorrent [4,19] where the primary interests were
performance related factors such as latency and fairness of resource utilization, recent
studies [16,17,14] focus more on the system’s reliability.
2.3 Secure Message Propagation Systems
The goal of alert distribution systems is to deliver small size messages to many partici-
pants under a strict time constraint. Ever since fast, self-replicating worms (for instance
Slammer and Nimda viruses) crippled the Internet, there have been many theoretical stud-
ies [30,1,26,24] to build an alert distribution system which can compete against such
worms. The outcome of this line of research was guidelines regarding how fast the patch
propagation should be. However, none of these works consider scenarios of active adver-
sary who also wants to take over the alert propagation processes.
In addition, RapidUpdate [23] is a research performed by research groups of commer-
cial security vendors. It offers a specific solution to their own alert propagation model.
The goal of the system is to propagate small sized alert messages (less than 200K) and
meet distribution deadlines. Having assistance from peers, the RapidUpdate tries to al-
leviate the workload of servers/vendors. Another work [7] by a major software vendor
quantifies the performance of the world’s biggest patch distribution system – Microsoft’s
Windows update. Based on trace analysis, this work delivers interesting observations on
traffic characteristics of patch distribution and end-user’s behavioral patterns. Nonethe-
less, no previous study considers the presence of a sophisticated adversary that attempts
to disrupt the operation of the alert distribution network.
3 Application Environment and Adversarial Scenarios
The key element of our work is the evaluation of different mechanisms for implementing
a rapid and reliable alert distribution system in the adversarial context. Previous analy-
ses of such systems were largely done without taking into account sophisticated (or, in
many cases, even simple) adversaries who might seek to disrupt the operation of the sys-
tem. Such disruption may, for example, be attempted in parallel with an attack, so as to
maximize its impact and minimize the effectiveness of any defenses.
The goal of the adversaries would be to delay distribution and delivery of such alerts,
or to prevent their delivery altogether to as large a fraction of the nodes as possible. We
consider different adversaries, at varying levels of sophistication and resources. For gen-
erality, our evaluation considers the impact such adversaries would have on the system, in
terms of inhibiting communications to/from some fraction of nodes.
The sophistication of the adversaries in our threat model is determined in terms of
their ability to collect reconnaissance on the internal structure of the alert distribution
mechanism and focus their attack. Thus, at a high level, we distinguish between two
types of adversaries:
– Adversary with random attack: Unsophisticated adversaries who can inhibit com-
munication to/from randomly selected nodes. The fraction of nodes they can bring
down depends on the level of resources available to them.
– Sophisticated adversaries, who exploit knowledge of the system structure to target
nodes such that they maximize the impact of their disruption. We further consider two
sub-types of such adversaries:
1. Adversary with targeted attack: Attackers that know and exploit the high-level
structure of the network topology. Such attackers, for example, know the identity
of and target the super-nodes or other, relatively “fixed” important nodes in the
system.
2. Adversary with degree dependent attack: More powerful adversaries that some-
how have detailed topology information about a large part or all of the distribution
mechanism. Such knowledge includes, for example, the complete connectivity
graph of the participating nodes (or a large fraction thereof).
For all type of the above schemes, selected victim nodes are taken out from the system as
a consequence of the attacks.
4 Implementation
For our evaluation, three different alert distribution systems were implemented on Over-
Sim [3] network simulation framework. Here, we describe how we implemented the sim-
ulation modules. We first talk about the design choices for the signaling channels and the
various reliability parameters that we explored. Then, we cover communication models
considered for alert distribution systems.
4.1 Control Channel
Centralized System In the case of centralized control, we employed a super node (SN)
network. Among many configuration parameters [27] for the SN network, we carefully
identified the ones that affect the robustness of the overall network: the size of sub-
network (cluster size) and number of super-node replicas (k-redundancy). The cluster size
was tested using a range of different values. The same holds for k-redundancy. However,
in our graphs, we present only the case where k-redundancy is two. We did so because
other values of k-redundancy do not notably change the system’s behavior beyond the
one captured by the graphs. We configured the rest of the parameters unchanged as these
parameters have an effect only on the network performance.
Distributed System For distributed control, we chose Chord [25] to implement a de-
centralized alert notification system. Chord was selected for two reasons. First, Chord’s
ring-based routing structure and ID space has been well-studied allowing us to compare
our performance results with others when the network is not under attack. This validates
our approach beyond the results of a mere simulation. Second, the structural differences
among variants of DHT implementations are not discernible in terms of robustness. In-
deed, most of the hash-based systems use a common architecture that employs key-based
routing [6]. Among many configurable parameters for Chord, we considered successor
list size to be the most important one to the reliability and stability of the system. This
was varied with different values to see its impact on the system’s maintenance cost and
reliability.
Hybrid System This model aims to achieve better network performance similar to the
centralized systems while maintaining the reliability of the purely decentralized approaches.
In hybrid systems, all nodes initially join both a decentralized and a centralized signaling
channel. For instance, a super-node in the hybrid network is the centralized entity for its
sub-network as well as a regular participant in the DHT channel. Therefore, the hybrid de-
signs inherit all their configuration parameters. Moreover, peers in the hybrid network can
utilize the primary (centralized) and secondary (decentralized) signaling channels either
in serial or parallel. In our implementation of hybrid systems, frequent operations such
as querying were done first using the centralized and then the decentralized signaling
path. This increases performance under normal operations while maintaining robustness
in case of attacks. However, for less frequent but more critical functions, such as pub-
lishing new information, we used both channels at the same time to increase resilience
without severely impacting the performance of the network.
4.2 Models for Alert Distribution
Publish-subscribe model In this model, peers have the option to subscribe to certain
classes of security events. Polling and pushing are available choices to implement this
model. For our experiments, we used the polling model with 30 seconds of polling in-
terval. This is a cost-effective and easy-to-implement solution, widely adopted by most
vendors for their online patching system.
Distributed sensors model In this model, participants with proper permission can be sen-
sors who can detect security incidents and initiate the alert propagation process. This is
typical model used to deploy large scale defense posture but it also comes with issues of
trust – the security information’s integrity and node authentication. For our experiment,
only nodes with proper permission can publish new message to subscribers. Their in-
tegrity is examined by super-nodes, in the case of centralized and hybrid mechanisms, or
peering nodes in charge of the ID segment, for distributed schemes.
5 Evaluation
In the section, we describe evaluation results for the alert distribution systems imple-
mented with three different control mechanisms. First, we explain the evaluation metrics
and then we talk about the reason behind the choice of the Oversim simulation frame-
work. Lastly, we discuss our evaluation results with and without global adversaries. For
each evaluation instance, all results are averaged over at least 10 iterations.
5.1 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the reliability and efficiency of the different control plane mechanisms, we
introduce three metrics: coverage, latency, and control efficiency. Coverage is measured


































































































(b) Control cost measurement
Fig. 1. The evaluation results under normal operations. Figure (a) depicts the mean notification time and the
completion time for 99% of the nodes and for different control plane mechanisms. Figure (b) presents the
total network cost in terms of bytes for the test duration of 600 seconds.
under attack. Alternatively, all alert messages that are not delivered within the duration
of the experiment instance are regarded as failures. Latency is defined to be the period
of time that it takes for alerts to reach each participant from the moment that an alert
message is dispatched. Control efficiency is the cost to utilize the control mechanisms.
This is calculated by summing the total number of bytes required for network operations
during the experiment.
5.2 Evaluation Design
To validate the network behavior under adversarial conditions, we implemented three con-
trol mechanisms using the OverSim [3] simulation framework. The use of simulation was
mandated for the following reasons:
Scalability We were interested in observing the behavior of large scale networks imple-
menting signaling systems in the presence of network-wide malicious attacks. Having
tens of thousands of number of participants, Oversim framework enabled us to quantify
the design parameters that really influence the behavior of the system.
Global adversary Emulating global adversary in a real-world large-scale testbed is a
costly and time-consuming task and it does not allow repetition of experiments. The sim-
ulation framework not only helped us to instantiate this size of network but also provided
the interface to implement a more precise behavior for the global adversary.
5.3 Evaluation under Normal Operation
To establish a baseline for our experimental results, we first measured the latency and con-
trol efficiency of the mechanisms without considering a global adversary. For test topolo-
gies of 20,000 nodes, each test instance was measured for 600 seconds of simulation time.
Each test instance contained an alert notification event and the same size (40KB) of con-
trol messages were propagated to all participants. The size is derived from the average
size of Microsoft patches [7]. SN network, implemented for centralized mechanism, was
configured with different cluster sizes and k-redundancy was fixed to 2 for all test cases.
DHT network was used for the distributed control mechanism and its successor list size
was set to five. Hybrid network inherited parameter from both systems.
Latency measurement The latency results are shown in Figure 1(a). On the X-axis,
from the left to right, we have results for the SN network, Hybrid network, and DHT
network. The SN network and hybrid network are configured with different cluster sizes.
For each bar, the dark portion represents the average time for notification and the gray part
represents the time until 99% of the nodes are notified. Large variance was observed for
the latency results of SN network. With different cluster sizes, mean latency ranged from
35 to 230 seconds. Populated sub-networks (lower-layer) accounted for delays in the case
of large cluster size (5,000). For smaller cluster size (50), having more super-nodes made
the upper-layer network the bottleneck. In contrast, for hybrid network, we observed small
variance in latency and less delays. This is because the secondary, distributed channels
masked the errors or failures of the primary channel. Mean latencies ranged only from 33
to 51 seconds. Not having a secondary channel, the DHT network took longer than the
worst case of hybrid network. However, the latency remained relatively low (61 seconds).
Control cost measurement Figure 1(b) represents the control cost of different mech-
anisms to propagate alert messages of the same size (40KB). SN network, thanks to its
simple implementation, required the least amount of packets to maintain its control chan-
nel and signaling operations. However, in the case of larger cluster size (5,000), many
number of network errors and retries introduced rapid increase in cost. DHT network re-
quired larger amount of control traffic to maintain its distributed data structures. Hybrid
network with large cluster size (5,000) required even more and was the most expensive
control channel due to excessive numbers of network errors from its primary channel.
However, with the proper choice of cluster size, hybrid network could spare its control
cost to become a more efficient solution than the DHT network.
5.4 Evaluation of Adversarial Scenarios
In adversarial scenarios, we again used the topology of 20,000 nodes with longer simu-
lation duration of 1,200 seconds to carefully observe the system’s reaction to malicious
activities. Nodes that could not be notified within this time duration were regarded as a
delivery failure. Two different cluster sizes were plotted for SN network and hybrid net-
work – 50 to represent a small cluster size and 5,000 for large cluster size. During the
experiment, the alert propagation event was triggered at 100 seconds of the simulation
time and the attack from the adversary was launched five seconds prior to the event.
Random attack evaluation In this attack scenario, the adversary randomly selects its
victims varying its attack ranges (0% ∼ 30%). The latency and coverage results against
this attack are shown in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) respectively. For DHT network, both
latency and coverage were most severely impacted by this attack. Having acceptable la-
tency from its initial stage, DHT network’s latency steadily increased. Network failures
that impacted coverage started approximately around 17 ∼ 18%. The coverage results
dropped rapidly from that point onwards. SN network showed better results than DHT





















(a) Random attack latency




























(b) Random attack coverage
Fig. 2. Figures (a) and (b) illustrate the latency and coverage for the random attack scenario respectively
and for different attack intensities. In (a), Y-axis shows average notification time and in (b), Y-axis shows the
percentage of nodes which successfully received the alert message.
network in terms of both metrics. It is interesting to note that the centralized mecha-
nism with a little redundancy configuration (k-redundancy=2) showed better coverage
results than the distributed system. In the DHT network, by distributing certain amount of
connections to all participants, each node’s failure had some influences on the system’s
connectivity. This resulted in network disintegration and gradual deterioration of latency
beyond a certain threshold. This result is consistent with the observation that DHT net-
work’s performance is severely influenced by even a small fraction of slow performing
nodes [20]. In the SN network, failures of all SN replicas for a sub-network significantly
deteriorate system’s latency and coverage. But, in the case of random attack, probability
to hit all replicas in the same group is exponentially low in regards to k-redundancy pa-
rameter. Irregular spikes in its latency and coverage results indicates this type of failures
where k-redundancy is two. Hybrid-network, by having dual channels, showed improved
coverage and latency results. While the hybrid network showed smoother results than the
SN network overall, systems with smaller cluster size had better latencies and reduced
traffic irregularities.
Targeted attack evaluation In this attack, the adversary takes one step further by
targeting nodes of explicit importance – super-nodes for the SN network and the hybrid
network. After selecting all available target nodes, the attacker randomly select the rest of
her victims. DHT does not expose any explicit targets. Thus, all the victims are selected
randomly. The attack in this case becomes identical to the random attack. Coverage result
against this attack are presented in Figure 3(a). Unlike the DHT network, whose results
didn’t changed much from the random attack result, the SN network is seriously impacted
by this attack. Having all super-nodes eliminated, the system stopped being operational
from the very initial stage of attack, less than or around 4%. Similarly, not having the
benefits of its primary SN channel, latency and coverage results of the hybrid network
soon converged to that of the DHT network.


























(a) Targeted attack coverage


























(b) Degree dependent attack coverage
Fig. 3. Figure (a) and (b) present coverage results for the targeted attack and degree dependent attack respec-
tively and for different attack intensities. Y-axis shows the percentage of nodes who successfully received the
alert message.
Degree dependent attack evaluation In this attack, the attacker can identify nodes
not only of explicit, but also of implicit importance. For this, she considers each node’s
topological significance. Super nodes maintain more state acting as defaults routes for the
their clusters and thus are higher priority targets. In Figure 4(a), we depict the connection
distribution for the hybrid network (of cluster size 50). We present the number of connec-
tions for the super-nodes and regular nodes using different colors. This Figure illustrates
how the attacker chooses its victims for degree dependent attack with different attack
rates of 1% and 4%. With respective dotted and dashed lines, the nodes with number of
connections above the lines will be the victims.
The coverage result against the attack is presented in Figure 3(b). Similar to the tar-
geted attack, SN network’s coverage deteriorated from the initial stage of the attack. By
choosing nodes with higher connectivity, this attack was highly effective in crippling the
DHT network. DHT’s coverage starts to drop around 7%∼8%. In the case of hybrid net-
work, the coverage was also impacted by the attack. The outcome for a large cluster
size (5,000) with few super-nodes, does not show much difference from the DHT net-
work’s result. The small cluster size (50) performed better and extended coverage about
4%, because it was able to distribute the SN connections more evenly across the network
curtailing the reachability failures due to the attacks.
Quantifying the behavior of the different signaling mechanisms when under different
attack scenarios allowed us to make this observation: hybrid network is the efficient solu-
tion for both adversarial and normal situations with the following benefits. i) latency-wise,
it was an efficient solution with less configuration sensitivity. ii) with the proper choice of
cluster size, the system consumes reasonable amount of control cost which is higher than
SN but less than DHT system. iii) Under all type of attacks, it showed the best resilience
in terms of coverage and latency. Another interesting observation is that SN network, even
with less network connections, could show better results than DHT network against the
random attack. However its reliability benefit is immediately cancelled by sophisticated
and targeted attackers.
6 Analysis
Our evaluation shows that the hybrid network gained the number of reliability benefits by
adding a constant number (two) of SN connections to the DHT network. This result in-
dicates that the number of connections and the way it connects participants can seriously
impact the reliability of the system. Unfortunately, the number of network connections is
constrained by both system and network resources. Therefore, we want to explore the de-
sign space that can enhance reliability by only improving the way it connects participants.
To that end, we investigate different ways of implementing control systems by using the
same number of connections. More concretely, we extend DHTs with the fixed number
(two) of connections in different ways to observe how these influence the coverage result.
The number of connections is the same one used from the previous evaluations. Of course,
this parameter can have significant impact on coverage results. However, for all propos-
als, we want to demonstrate how we can add connections under the same constraints and
maximize the coverage benefits.
To further enhance the system’s behavior when attacked, we leverage the benefits of
DHT’s internal structure with a modified routing table. This technique, which exploits
finger-table, is implemented for Chord and is also applicable to other DHT systems.
6.1 Chord Connection Types
The Chord maintains two types of logical network connections. One for the successor
lists and the other for the finger table entries.
– Successor list maintains the list of neighboring nodes. It is an important parameter
that influences DHT’s reliability and its default size is set to five. Having a O(log n)
size of this connection provably guarantees the stability of the system which indicates
success rate of lookup request.
– Finger table is a core data structure that implements O(log n) routing of Chord. The
upper limit of its size is logarithmic to the size of hash space (in the case of Chord,
this is set to 2160).
Unlike previous proposals which naı¨vely added SN connection to DHT connections, we
implement a hybrid network utilizing existing slots of finger tables. SN connections can
be replaced with immediately preceding entries in the finger table. This does not increase
the required state per node or the total number of connections, but this costs additional
hops for lookup activities due to some sub-optimal entries.
Label Control mechanisms
DHT Chord with successor list size of 5 (default).
DHT S-list Extend DHT by adding 2 connections to successor list. Successor list size is set to 7.
HYBR Hybrid mechanism that naı¨vely integrates 2 additional SN connections to DHT.
This is the hybrid network used from previous evaluations.
HYBR F-table This extends HYBR by integrating 2 additional SN-connections with the finger table.
Table 1. Control mechanisms and their labels
6.2 Evaluation of Network Coverage
We measured the performance of our proposed modifications in terms of coverage. To that
end, we present our experimental results from the degree dependent attack by varying its
attack rate (0% ∼ 30%) for a network of 20,000 participating nodes. The cluster size for
hybrid network was set to 50 to make the effect of SN connections more pronounced.
With larger cluster sizes, thus smaller SN connections, we expect coverage results similar
to that of a DHT network. Table 1 details specific configurations and their labels used for
evaluations. The evaluation results are presented in Figure 4(b).
The last three configurations (DHT S-list, HYBR, HYBR F-table) from Table 1 are
implemented with the same number (two) of additional connections to the original Chord
DHTs (DHT). The result for DHT S-list shows the limited effects of the two additional
success list entries. From Figure 4(b), this improves coverage only by 2 ∼ 3%. The result
for HYBR shows better coverage (5 ∼ 6%) than DHT S-list. Although SN connections
replace connections assigned to the successor list, the structural benefits offered by the SN
network are far greater. This is apparent in the HYBR F-table, by harnessing the reliability
benefits of both successor list entries and SN connections, the coverage is boosted by
7 ∼ 9%. Furthermore, penalty for having two sub-optimal entries in its finger table is
negligible and requires only a small amount of additional lookup calls (3.4%).
The experimental results present interesting insight about the trade-offs between net-
work structure and their impact on reliability. We can deduct that additional entries in the
list have limited effect. Thus, it is better to consider other avenues of adding connections
in order to enhance system’s reliability. Modifying the finger table can be an option to
consider because it increases coverage without deteriorating its original functionality.





























(a) Distribution of incoming connection

























(b) Integrations under the degree dependent attack
Fig. 4. (a) enumerates connections for nodes in a hybrid network with cluster size of 50. The dotted and
dashed lines show the impact of the degree dependent attack. The attacker choose victims with number of
connection above the lines. (b) presents the coverage for different modifications and for the degree dependent
attack. In X-axis we vary the attack intensity while Y-axis shows the alert success rate.
7 Conclusions
We evaluated alert distribution systems implemented using three control channel mecha-
nisms under different adversarial scenarios. Our evaluation enabled us to draw a number
of interesting insights regarding the reliability of the signaling channel. The pure dis-
tributed system (DHTs), designed to be robust under attacks, suffers in terms of network
performance including latency and coverage. In the case of random attack, DHTs reliabil-
ity turned out to be worse than that of a super-node based centralized design. To alleviate
this, we proposed the integration of centralized and the distributed designs. Our approach
consists of structural changes that enable us to seamlessly integrate a SN network and
a DHT network. We evaluated a hybrid network design that offered the best coverage
and reliability under all type of attack scenarios. We believe that with proper engineering
choices, we can further enhance the system’s reliability.
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